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Rule 26(c)(7) Protective Orders:
Just What Are You Hiding
Under There, Anyway?
BY Ross T. TURNER*
INTRODUCTION
Judicious division of labor between a large number of defense counsel
can tax the limits ofplainti fts counsel's ability and decrease the quality
of the plaintif's counsel's product.I
A consumer is seriously injured by an allegedly defective
/ product. One month later, another consumer is killed in a
.L .similar accident involving the sameproduct. Separateproducts
liability actions are filed against the manufacturer alleging the same
product defect. During discovery, the manufacturer provides inconsistent
responses to identical discovery requests from the respective attorneys for
the injured consumers, but the injured parties, their attorneys, and the court
will never know of the conflicting answers. The plaintiffs' attorneys must
refrain from sharing or comparing what their individual discovery has
revealed. Should the cases settle prior to trial, the public will never know
of the allegedly defective product. Why? Because the manufacturer
successfully moved for, or the attorneys for the injured consumers agreed
to, the entry of protective orders or confidentiality agreements.2
* J.D. expected 2000, University of Kentucky. The author wishes to thank his
father, Thomas E. Turner, J.D. 1970, University of Kentucky, for his guidance, his
wisdom, and, most importantly, his patience.
' Albert H. Parnell, The Coordinated Group Defense, FOR THE DEFENSE, Nov.
1980, at 16, 19. The author of this seemingly obvious statement was the former
lead counsel for Johns-Manville Corp. before asbestos litigation forced the com-
pany into bankruptcy. See Joseph F. Rice & Nancy Worth Davis, Judicial Innova-
tion in Asbestos Mass Tort Litigation, 33 ToRT & INS. L.J. 127, 136 n.52 (1997).
2 The terms "protective order" and "confidentiality agreement" are often used
interchangeably. While both typically limit the use or dissemination of information,
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I. SCOPE
The defense bar has recognized that plaintiffs have "demonstrated a
propensity for finding ways to streamline the expenditure of time, effort,
and expense necessary to litigate against a particular defendant and
product, [and] defense counsel can expect an increase in plaintiffs
counsel's sharing of discovery materials."3 In response to this perceived
threat, plaintiffs can expect a similar increase in the defense's attempted
use of protective orders as provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(c)(7)4 and its analogous state counterparts.5 As part of an overall
strategy of attrition waged by manufacturers against individual plaintiffs,
the use, and often the misuse, of protective orders to shield or limit the use
of documents produced in response to discovery requests is becoming the
rule rather than the exception.6 This is due in part to the perception that the
typical defendant's strategy in a products liability case is to
[m]ake this litigation so difficult and so expensive that most plaintiffs'
attorneys will be overwhelmed, abandon the claim, and never try this kind
of litigation again; make the discovery process extremely time-consuming
for the parties and the court; [and] encourage the courts to deny discovery
requests by suggesting that this will "move the case along."7
This Note will explore the circumstances underwhichprotective orders
limiting the use and/or dissemination of "trade secret[s] or other confiden-
a "confidentiality agreement" usually refers to an agreement by the parties, while
a "protective order" refers to one entered by the court pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P.
26(c). For a discussion of the provisions of this rule, see infra Part HI.B.
' Kerry A. Kearney & Tracey G. Benson, Preventing Non-Party Access to
Discovery Materials in Products Liability Actions: A Defendant's Primer, in 4
CURRENT ISSUES IN L. & MED. 36, 43-44 (Defense Research Inst. Series No. 4,
1987).
4 FED. R. Cfv. P. 26(c)(7).
5 See, e.g., KY. R. CIV. P. 26.03(1)(g) (West 1998). The federal and Kentucky
rules governing civil discovery protective orders are for all practical purposes
identical. See infra note 69.
6 See Teresa M. Hendricks & Joseph W. Moch, Protective Orders: The
Industry's Silencer on the Smoking Gun, 73 MICH. B.J. 424, 424 (1994).
7 Dianne Jay Weaver, Foreword to FRANCIS H. HARE, JR. ET AL., FULL DIS-
CLOSURE: COMBATING STONEWALLING AND OTHER DISCOVERY ABUSES at xxvii
(1994) [hereinafter HARE, JR. ET AL., FULL DISCLOSURE].
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tial... information s are appropriate in products liability actions brought
by individual plaintiffs against corporate manufacturer defendants. It
focuses on a common problem: the entry of protective orders, whether by
court order or by agreement of the parties, covering documents that are not
entitled to such protection under the rules of civil procedure. The circum-
stances of a given case may also raise questions regarding the ethical and
legal propriety of such requests. A manufacturer, like any commercial
litigant, clearly has an interest in preventing the disclosure of true trade
secrets to its competitors.9 That same manufacturer is not, however, entitled
to misuse the rules in an attempt to force an individual plaintiff to try her
case in a vacuum. 10
Part II examines the legal and ethical obligations of the manufacturer's
counsel-to the client, to the plaintiff, and to the court-when considering
whether to seek either an agreed-upon ora court-enteredprotective order. It
focuses on the considerations that must be addressed by the manufacturer's
counsel under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Federal Rules")" and
8 FED. K CIV. P. 26(c)(7). Although this Note is concerned primarily with the
rights and obligations of individual parties to products liability actions, the battle
over the use of protective orders is being waged on several fronts. The public's
right to access of discovered documents, particularly where an allegedly defective
product is involved, is hotly debated. Compare Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality,
Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 427, 428
(1991) (arguing against reform that would "creat[e] a presumption of public
access" to information obtained during discovery), with Jacqueline S. Gu~nfgo,
Note, Trends in Protective Orders under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c):
Why Some Cases Fumble While Others Score, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 541, 549
(1991) (conceding "the presumption of public access created by Rule 26(c)"). A
side issue to that debate is the effect of the United States Supreme Court's ruling
in the First Amendment case of Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 37
(1984), that when a protective order is entered on a showing of good cause, is
limited to discovery, and does not cover evidence obtained from other sources, it
does not violate the First Amendment. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. FORTUNE ET AL.,
MODERN LITIGATION AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY HANDBOOK § 7.2.4
(1996) ("The federal appellate courts have interpreted Seattle Times as requiring,
at most, a nod in the direction of the first amendment before issuing a protective
order."). These questions are beyond the scope of this Note.
9See infra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
'
0 See Francis H. Hare, Jr. & James L. Gilbert, Resisting Confidentiality Orders,
TRIAL, Oct. 1990, at 50, 50 [hereinafter Hare, Jr. & Gilbert, Resisting
Confidentiality Orders].
" See infra Part HA, notes 21-33.
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the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.12 Part III covers the statutory
authority for civil discovery protective orders. It includes an overview of
the modem discovery system, the issues giving rise to the need for protec-
tive orders, and the primary rule governing their use in products liability
actions. 13 This section sets forth the minimum requirements which must be
satisfied for the entry of a protective order, cautions against a plaintiff's un-
questioning agreement to such an order, and further cautions against a
court's granting these requests as a matter of course. 4 It also discusses the
emergence of "umbrella" or "blanket" protective orders, which may be
used as a means of shielding documents not otherwise entitled to protection
under the rules and of effectively shifting the burden of proof as to the ap-
propriateness of an order from the manufacturer to the individual plaintiff.5
Part IV addresses a relatively new concept that many believe is the
primary reason for the misuse of protective orders: information sharing by
similarly situated plaintiffs. This section explains that information sharing
can help alleviate the disparities in resources between plaintiffs and
defendants in products liability cases and discusses the rise of information
exchange groups. Finally, Part V reaches the conclusion that where the
statutory elements of Rule 26(c)(7) have been satisfied by a corporate
manufacturer defendant, protective orders are properly entered; that where
these elements are lacking, legal and ethical rules prohibit their use; and
that it will rarely if ever be beneficial in the long run for a plaintiff to agree
to such orders where those elements have not been satisfied.
Whether used as a sword or a shield, 16 both the federal and Kentucky
rules provide for the entry of protective orders when certain requirements
are met. 17 This Note will explore the factors, both legal and ethical, that
must be addressed by the parties and the court before a protective order is
sought or entered." A long line of federal district and circuit court
opinions, as well as a growing number of analogous state court decisions,
attest that parties to products liability litigation continue to disagree over
the use of protective orders with considerable frequency."
12See infra Part I.B, notes 34-56.
13See infra Part 1I.A, notes 57-77.
14 See infra Part HI.B, notes 78-124.
" See infra Part I.C, notes 125-44.
16 See generally Glen Mark Thompson, Note, Protective Orders: Sword and
Shield in the War ofDiscovery, 12 AM. J. TRIAL ADvOC. 483 (1989).
17 See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
18See infra Part II.
'
9 Befitting an issue of concern to products liability plaintiffs, who are often
thrust into the role of David in their struggle against a corporate Goliath, the body
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It has been noted that the discovery process "concededily may work to
the disadvantage as well as to the advantage of individual plaintiffs.
Discovery, in other words, is not a one-way proposition."'2 This Note
maintains that both plaintiffs and manufacturers in products liability
actions should be subject to the same construction and application of the
discovery rules.
II. THE MANUFACTURER'S COUNSEL'S
LEGAL AND ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS
A. Rule 1: The Overriding Consideration
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1 provides that all federal procedural
rules "shall be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action."21 Rule 1 was amended in 1993,
adding the words "and administered" in recognition of "the affirmative
duty of the court... to ensure that civil litigation is resolved not only
fairly, but also without undue cost or delay. As officers of the court,
attorneys share this responsibility with the judge to whom the case is
assigned."2 Ironically, Rule 1 is often cited, by courts and commentators,
by opponents and proponents alike, as the primary factor in questions
involving the use of protective orders The plaintiff often contends that it
of work extolling the virtues of protective orders from a defendant's perspective
is voluminous. See, e.g., Richard P. Campbell, The Protective Order in Products
Liability Litigation: Safeguard orMisnomer?, 31 B.C. L. REV. 771 (1990); Paul S.
Doherty I, Public Policy Favors the Liberal Use ofProtective Orders in Products
Liability Litigation, 4 PRODUCTS LIABILITY L.J. 143 (1993); James R. Jarrow,
Industrial Espionage? Discovery Within the Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Battle for Protective Orders Governing Trade Secrets and Confidential
Information, 32 WASHBURN L.J. 318 (1993).20 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
21 FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
I Id. 1 advisory committee's note.
I Compare Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 113 F.R.D. 86,91 (D.N.J. 1986)
(stating "requests to limit the use of discovery to the litigation in which it is initially
obtained" is "counter to a fundamental purpose of discovery under the Federal
Rules" and "the admonition of Rule 1"), and Gu6n6go, supra note 8, at 571
(arguing that allowing the release of discovered evidence to other litigants
"comports with Rule 1, outweighing defendants' arguments that disclosure thwarts
Rule l's purpose"), with Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F.
Supp. 866, 892 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (grouping cumbersome data into manageable
categories to support a Rule 26(c) order "is desirable from the standpoint of case
1998-99] 1303
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is less expensive for present and future litigants to share the fruits of
discovery with one another. Meanwhile, the manufacturer asserts that it
will be less expensive and speedier if sharing among plaintiffs is restricted
by claiming that all discovered information is confidential, without the
time- and labor-intensive process of selecting each particular document
which may actually contain confidential information.2'
Manufacturers routinelyrequest protective orders, eitherby court order
or by agreement, when faced with a number of cases involving the same
alleged product defect.2 The manufacturer's counsel will agree to produce
the requested documents, but only under an agreement of confidentiality.26
Often "plaintiff's counsel will voluntarily execute the protective order out
of a sense of relief that the sought-after documents will finally be
produced."'27 Seldom in these circumstances is the manufacturer required
by the court to make any showing that the requirements of Rule 26(c) have
been met.28
management and is consistent with the instruction of Rule 1"), and Campbell,
supra note 19, at 772 (asserting that "application of the Rules of Civil Procedure
to products liability litigation ... often produces results that are wholly inconsistent
with the paramount goal of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as articulated in
Rule 1").
24 See infra notes 126-36 and accompanying text. Manufacturers commonly
argue that the interests of speed and financial economy are best served by the entry
of a protective order prohibiting dissemination of any material exchanged through
discovery. See, e.g., Cipollone, 113 F.R.D. at 93. Due to the massive amounts of
documents involved in most products liability actions, and to reduce supervision
by the court, some courts have accepted this contention even when the plaintiff has
objected. See Tavoulareas v. Piro, 93 F.R.D. 24,29-30 (D.D.C. 1981) (stating that
whether the protective order would serve the interests of the court was a proper
factor to consider). Note, however, that manufacturers rarely discuss the "just"
element of Rule 1. See infra note 33.
' See Hare, Jr. & Gilbert, Resisting Confidentiality Orders, supra note 10, at
50.
1 A manufacturer's request for a protective order is often the result of the
plaintiff's motion to compel discovery, filed after receiving inadequate responses
to discovery requests. When faced with the court's discovery order, the claim that
the information should be protected suddenly arises. See Peter Perlman, Protective
Orders: Public Safety at the Mercy of Private Justice 1 (unpublished manuscript
from presentation to St. Ives Journal Club (Apr. 25, 1989)) (on file with author).
Mr. Perlman, noted products liability attorney andveteran of many protective order
disputes, offered invaluable insight into many of the ideas presented in this Note.
27Id. at 2.
28 See id.
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The benefits to the manufacturer resulting from entry of the protective
order are numerous. Individual plaintiffs with similar actions and discovery
needs are forcedinto duplicitous andtime-consuming discovery, increasing
the litigation costs in both time and dollars for each plaintiff.2 9 In addition,
counsel for the injured consumer is prevented from discussing or compar-
ing the documents received to those received by others with similar cases.
By restricting the ability to discuss the documents, the manufacturer
severely limits meaningful consultation between plaintiffs' counsel. If the
manufacturer's responses to multiple plaintiffs are inconsistent, the
differences will necessarily go undetected. °
In return, the plaintiff receives nothing. An agreed protective order is,
in effect, an agreement whereby the plaintiff relinquishes her rights to use
and compare the discovered information and, in return, receives from the
defendant exactly what she is otherwise entitled to under the discovery
rules. The "carrot" is that the defendant will produce the documents
without protracted discovery disputes.3'
Due to the nature of the legal system and the current discovery rules,
"there are many opportunities, if not incentives, for attorneys to engage in
discovery that, although authorized by the broad, permissive terms of the
rules, nevertheless results in delay."'32 Products liability actions, and
particularly unqualified requests for protective orders, often provide ample
opportunities for such delays and not the "just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination" mandated by Rule 1.33
29 See id. at 7.
30 See id.
31 Some even suggestthat, without aprotective order, the chances of settlement
are diminished. See Campbell, supra note 19, at 835 (stating that where a defendant
"can no longer rely upon protective orders as a tool to facilitate full and complete
disclosure of relevant confidential information, the settlement of cases will be
delayed or prevented").
3 2 FED. R. CIv. P. 26 advisory committee's note.
33 FED. R. Civ. P. 1. The operative word in Rule 1 is "and." The rule does not
call for the just, speedy or inexpensive determination of every action. Not
surprisingly, the 'just" requirement of Rule 1 receives little or no attention from
most protective order proponents. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 19, at 772-73
(asserting that agreed protective orders make "great strides... toward securing the
relatively speedy and inexpensive determination of lawsuits"); Doherty, supra note
19, at 154 (stating that umbrella protective orders "are especially effective tools to
expedite discovery"); Jarrow, supra note 19, at 325 (noting that liberal use of
protective orders would "truly expedite the process").
The "just" requirement has been noted by courts in other contexts. In a products
liability action involving the infamous "killer" multi-piece truck rims, the trial
13051998-99]
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B. The Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct: Expedition and Access
The problems associated with the speedy determination requirement of
Rule I affect all aspects of a products liability action, but perhaps nowhere
are they more acute, and the abuse more widespread, than during discovery.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules") offer some
guidance, ifno clear answers. Several provisions are applicable to requests
for protective orders by manufacturers in products liability actions. Model
Rule 3.2 states that "[a] lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite
litigation consistent with the interests of the client."'34 Model Rule 3.4(a)
provides that a lawyer shall not "unlawfully obstruct another party's access
to evidence."35 In addition, Model Rule 3.4(d)'s prohibition against the
making of frivolous discovery requests is implicated in some cases.36
The comment to Model Rule 3.2 serves as a starting point for an
analysis of whether a manufacturer's request for a protective order is
proper. The drafters began by stating, "Dilatory practices bring the
administration ofjustice into disrepute."'37 In an age marked by skepticism
on the part of the general public toward the practice of law, this comment
should guide the parties' discovery decision-making and conduct.38 The
comment to Rule 3.1 also makes clear that the "duty to use legal procedure
for the fullest benefit of the client's cause"'39 is no defense to the improper
use of protective orders, noting that "[r]ealizing financial or other benefit
from otherwise improper delay in litigation is not a legitimate interest of
the client. ' O Finally, the comment to Rule 3.2 states:
court automatically excluded from evidence all of the defendant's documents that
were dated after the date of manufacture of the product at issue. Jackson v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 788 F.2d 1070, 1084 (5th Cir. 1986). The appellate
court stated, "While this approach certainly promotes the cause of efficiency, we
think that the overriding goal of justice demands a more sensitive analysis." Id.
34 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.2 (1998).
35Id. Rule 3A(a).
36See id. Rule 3.4(d).
37Id. Rule 3.2 cmt.
38 See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Faces of Mistrust: The Image ofLawyers in
Public Opinion, Jokes, and Political Discourse, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 805 (1998).
39 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 cmt4 1 Id. Rule 3.2 cmt. Umbrella protective orders may be used to restrict more
information than is properly entitled to protection, and agreed protective orders can
remove the manufacturer's burden of proving entitlement to protection altogether.
See infra Part flI.C.
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Delay should not be indulged merely for the convenience of the advo-
cates, or for the purpose of frustrating an opposing party's attempt to
obtain rightful redress or repose. It is not a justification that similar
conduct is often tolerated by the bench and bar. The question is whether
a competent lawyer acting in good faith would regard the course of action
as having some substantial purpose other than delay.4'
Thus many of the justifications put forth by manufacturers in support
of such protection are specifically rejected by the drafters of the Model
Rules. First, manufacturers often contend that all discovered documents
should be covered, regardless of whether they are confidential or otherwise
entitled to protection, because to require strict adherence to the provision
of Rule 26(c) is time-consuming and labor-intensive.42 Second, improper
protective order requests clearly canbe used to frustrate a products liability
plaintiff's attempt to obtain information critical to her claim and often lead
only to delay.43 Finally, the current tolerance of unjustified protective
orders is perhaps best evidenced by the lack-thus far-of ethical and legal
opinions directed at such misuse.44 It cannot be maintained, however, that
a particular course of action is necessarily "ethical" by virtue of not being
specifically covered by an ethical rule or because there are no published
opinions explaining a clearly applicable rule.
Under Model Rule 3.4(a), a lawyer must not unlawfully45 obstruct
access to evidence.' The comments state that "the adversary system
41 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.2 cmt.
42 See the discussion of umbrella protective orders infra Part mI.C.
43 See infra Part IV.
4 No opinions were found that directly address the primary question posed
here: whether a lawyer for a manufacturer in a products liability action violates an
ethical duty by seeking or requesting a protective order for discovered information
not entitled to protection under Rule 26(c) or otherwise.
'5 The wording of Model Rule 3.4(a) does not specifically address the question
of whether an improper request for a protective order is "unlawful." While this
question is beyond the spirit and scope of this Note, it has been recognized that the
rule "piggybacks on law external to the rule without identifying specifically the
external law on which the meaning of the rule depends." Fairness to Opposing
Party: Destroying Evidence, [Manual] Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA)
61:705 (Sept. 17, 1997). Some legal scholars have argued that the term
"unlawfully" in Rule 3.4(a) refers not only to criminal law but also to conduct that
violates the discovery rules. Id. at 61:705-06.
4 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4(a). Likewise, the
Model Code directs a lawyer not to suppress evidence that the client has a legal
obligation to reveal or produce. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPON-
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contemplates that the evidence in a case is to be marshalled competitively
by the contending parties." 7 The drafters specifically point out that "[f]air
competition in the adversary system is secured by prohibitions against...
obstructive tactics in discovery procedure.48 Finally, echoing a sentiment
that has particular significance in products liability actions, the drafters
note that "[d]ocuments and other items 6f evidence are often essential to
establish a claim or defense." 49
When protective orders are sought in cases where their use is unwar-
ranted but there has been no clearly "unlawful" conduct, Rule 3.4(a) may
be difficult to apply. This is due in part to the general rule that litigants
have no general duty to reveal damaging information to their adversaries. 0
Although courts frequently invoke this rule in cases where lawyers have
allegedly"improperlywithheld or concealed information,"51 the correlation
between the general rule and the ethical propriety of such conduct should
not be viewed as dispositive.
Less apparent, though perhaps much more threatening, is the notion
that in attempting to force each individual plaintiff to try her case in a
vacuum, a manufacturer's request for a protective order drags the entire
judicial system into the vacuum with her.52 In a never-ending parroting of
the idea that the protective order will simplify discovery in this case, the
effect on later litigants is brushed aside. Nonetheless, the court will
undoubtedly see the same manufacturer, in similar cases, making this
argument again and again. The "[j]udicious division of labor between a
SIBILITYDR7-109(A) (1983). According to the Restatement oftheLaw Governing
Lawyers, a lawyer may not obstruct access to evidence "when doing so would
violate a court order or a criminal statute dealing with obstruction of justice or a
similar offense." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOvERNING LAWYERS §
178(2) (Tentative Draft No. 8, 1997); see Fairness to Opposing Party, supra note
45, at 61:705.47 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4(a) cmt.48 Id.
491 Id. This is especially true for plaintiffs in products liability cases. See dis-
cussion infra notes 196-98 and accompanying text.
50 See Fairness to Opposing Party: Concealing, Obstructing Access to Evi-
dence, [Manual] Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 61:709 (Sept. 17,
1997).
S Id. at 61:709 (citing In re Enstar Corp., 593 A.2d 543 (Del. Ch. Ct. 1991),
rev'd on other grounds, 604 A.2d 404 (Del. 1992)). This idea that a lawyer has no
duty to reveal damaging information is further seen in ethics opinions stating that
"generally there is no professional duty to disclose information that would be
helpful to the opposing party." Id. at 61:709.52 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4(d).
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large number of defense counsel can tax the limits of plaintiff's counsel[]
... ."3 In doing so, it also taxes the limits of an already overburdened court
system.
The Model Rules raise no fewer than three critical questions that must
be addressed by the manufacturer's counsel when deciding to seek a
protective order: Is the order sought merely for the convenience of the
defendant or its counsel?' Is the purpose of the order to frustrate the
plaintiffs attempts "to obtain rightful redress or repose"?55 Would "a
competent lawyer acting in good faith.., regard the [order] as having [no]
substantial purpose other than delay"? 6 If the answer to any of these
question is yes, then counsel should refrain from making the request. If the
manufacturer is unable or unwilling to answer these questions, then it is
incumbent on the plaintiff's counsel, and the court, to demand that they
respond.
m. AUTHORITY FOR DISCOVERY PROTECTIVE ORDERS
A. The Modern Discovery System
Discovery is a relatively new concept in the litigation process. Prior to
the adoption of the Federal Rules in 1938, the "pre-trial functions of
notice-giving, issue-formulation and fact-revelation were performed pri-
marily and inadequately by the pleadings."' Adverse parties would plead
back and forth until a legal or factual issue arose.5 Where necessary infor-
mation could not be gleaned from the pleadings, the "parties were forced
to obtain [it] ... by whatever means of private investigation they could af-
ford."59 Trials were essentially "carried on in the dark," with surprise being
51 Parnell, supra note 1, at 19. For a discussion of misuse of the discovery
process with delay tactics and other ethical considerations facing litigators during
discovery, see FORTUNE ET AL., supra note 8, § 6, at 241.
54 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.2 cmt.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500 (1947) (footnote omitted).
51 See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 916
(1987).
" Thompson, supra note 16, at 484 (footnote omitted) (citing Hickman, 329
U.S. at 500); see also Tiedman v. American Pigment Corp., 253 F.2d 803,808 (4th
Cir. 1958).
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a constant and uncertain factor facing every litigator.6 ° The parties could
never be sure that they even knew all of the issues or facts until trial, when
they would be elicited, often for the first time, from the witness stand.6'
The drafters of the Federal Rules noted that "[t]he purpose of discovery
is to provide a mechanism for making relevant information available to the
litigants."'62 It is now taken for granted that "[m]utual knowledge of all the
relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation."'63 In
place of common law pleading, the Federal Rules provide for broad pre-
trial discovery.64 The discovery rules were intended in part to end the days
of trial by surprise.6 Their primary function is to allow "the parties to
obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trial,"'
and they have consistently been interpreted broadly.67 It is well established
that anything needed as evidence in a party's case that is not otherwise
protected should be available through the discovery process.68 The Federal
Rules, and those rules subsequently enacted by many states, 69 sought to
make the trial process "less a game of blindman's [bluff] and more a fair
contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable
extent."'7 An unforeseen byproduct of the liberal construction of the
discovery rules, however, was that discovery requests could be abusive,
oppressive, and burdensome in some cases.
60Hickman, 329 U.S. at 501.
61 Although the discovery rules are relatively new, the ideas that spawned them
are not. Exparte Uppercu, 239 U.S. 435 (1915), decided long before the adoption
of the Federal Rules, illustrates the need to make all information available to the
litigants. In Uppercu, a party in a subsequent action petitioned the court to modify
a sealing order to permit access to materials produced in an earlier action. See id.
at 435. Ruling in favor of the petitioner, Justice Holmes recognized the basic
premise underlying modem discovery: "So long as the object physically exists,
anyone needing it as evidence at a trial has a right to call for it, unless some
exception is shown to the general rule." Id. at 440.62 FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note.
61 Hickman, 329 U.S. at 507.
6 See Doherty, supra note 19, at 144.65 See Hickman, 329 U.S. at 507.
661Id. at 501.
67 See id. at 507; Proctor & Gamble Distrib. Co. v. Vasseur, 275 S.W.2d 941,
944 (Ky. 1955).68 See Hickman, 329 U.S. at 515 (Jackson, I., concurring).
69 The Kentucky civil rules are in many respects identical to the federal rules
and "actually are cut from the federal cloth." Newsome v. Lowe, 699 S.W.2d 748,
749 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).
70 United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958).
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In response, the Federal Rules were amended in 19701 to strengthen
the trial court's ability to control the discovery process.
72
[B]y centralizing the discovery principles in Rule 26 and making them
applicable to all [discovery] devices, the amendments reflected... aview
of pretrial [proceedings] as being an integrated process subject to
overarching control by the trial court.
The amendments transferred the governance of protective orders
from Rule 30(b) to Rule 26(c) and made protective orders applicable to
all forms of discovery. To "reflect[ ] existing law," the rulemakers also
added a specific reference to "trade secret[s] or other confidential
research, development, or commercial information." [Rule 26(c)]
articulated the growing understanding that the Federal Rules provide for
broad discovery and rely on the district court's discretion to decide
whether protective restrictions are necessary in a particular case.
73
The chief opposition to modem discovery initially came from
plaintiffs' attorneys as defense counsel learned that they could use the rules
to force plaintiffs to disclose their cases in advance.74 Today, some
manufacturers have found anew use for the discovery rule. No matter what
face is put on the use of protective orders, it seems that manufacturers in
products liability actions realize that unfettered access to critical informa-
tion tends to reduce the effects of their tremendous advantage in
resources.' Protective orders are their sword in dealing with this challenge.
71 For a detailed review of the evolution of the federal discovery system, see
Miller, supra note 8, at 447-63. Professor Miller examines the legal climate
surrounding the adoption of the Rules in 1938 and the 1970, 1980, and 1983
amendments to the discovery rules, as well as policy and other considerations
giving rise to these changes. See id. For an in-depth look at a recent proposal to
further modify the rule governing protective orders, see Richard J. Vangelisti,
Proposed Amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) Concerning
Protective Orders: A Critical Analysis of What It Means and How It Operates,
48 BAYLORL. REV. 163 (1996).
7 See Miller, supra note 8, at 450.
I d. at 450-51 (footnotes omitted).
74See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 515 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring).
7sSee Hendricks & Moch, supra note 6, at 424 ("[The] hidden agenda... is to
divide and conquer plaintiffs by preventing them from sharing and coordinating
discovery."); HARE, JR. ETAL., FULLDISCLOSURE, supra note 7, at 159-62 ("[The]
true motive ... is to deny plaintiffs the benefit of coordinating their discovery
efforts.").
13111998-99]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Many of the issues underlying the advent of modem products liability are
called into question when analyzing protective order problems. Most
notably, the manufacturer has possession and control of virtually all the
information needed by an injured plaintiff to prove her case76 and the
resources to shift enormous amounts of unnecessary expense to the
plaintiff.77
B. Rule 26(c)(7): The Minimum Requirements for Protection
Both the Federal Rules and Kentucky rules provide authority, upon a
showing of good cause, for the entry of "any order which justice requires
to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression,
or undue burden or expense, including... that a trade secret or other
confidential research, development, or commercial information not be
disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way.' 8 If the party seeking
the protective order successfully demonstrates that the information is
entitled to protection and that good cause exists for entry of the order, "the
burden shifts to the party seeking discovery" to demonstrate that the
information at issue "is relevant and necessary."79 The court must weigh the
competing interests of the affected parties, and the court possesses
substantial latitude to fashion an order that minimizes the negative impact
of the disclosure.0
1. The Information Must Be Entitled to Protection
The manufacturer in complex products liability actions must first show
that the information requested by the plaintiff is entitled to protection.8'
The reference to trade secrets and other confidential commercial informa-
tion added in the 1970 amendments to the Federal Rules was intended to
76 See infra notes 164-65 and accompanying text
77 See infra note 163 and accompanying text.71 Ky. R. Civ. P. 26.03(l)(g) (West 1998). For all practical purposes, the federal
and Kentucky rules governing protective orders are identical. The Kentucky rule
substitutes "disclosed" for the federal rule's "revealed." Compare KY. R. CIV. P.
26.03(l)(g) (West 1998), with FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(7).79 Anerican Standard, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 828 F.2d 734, 741 (Fed. Cir. 1987).81 See Miller, supra note 8, at 433-35; see also infra Part mI.C.
81 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(7). No authorities were revealed for the proposition
that any information other than "a trade secret or other confidential research,
development, or commercial information," id., is entitled to the protection of Rule
26(c)(7) nor does the rule so provide, see id.
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reflect existing law: "The courts have not given trade secrets automatic and
complete immunity against disclosure, but have in each case weighed their
claim to privacy against the need for disclosure. Frequently, they have been
afforded a limited protection."82
Although manufacturers commonly argue that a protective order is
justified because the information is a trade secret" entitled to protection
under the Federal Rules, "information sought in such cases rarely falls
within this narrowly defined category." 4 A number of jurisdictions have
adopted the definition of a trade secret found in section 757 of the
Restatement of Torts.85 Under this definition, a trade secret is "any formula,
pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one's
business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over
competitors who do not know or use it." 6
82 Id. 26 advisory committee's note.
83 In 1925, Kentucky's highest court defined a trade secret as "a plan or pro-
cess, tool, mechanism, or compound, known only to its owner and those of
his employees to whom it is necessary to confide it." Progress Laundry Co.
v. Hamilton, 208 Ky. 348, 270 S.W. 834, 835 (Ky. 1925). The court elaborated
on this definition in 1966, stating that a trade secret is "a novel and unique
plan or process, tool, mechanism, or compound, known only to its owner and
his employees, which has been perfected and appropriated by the exercise of
individual ingenuity." Mid-States Enter., Inc. v. House, 403 S.W.2d 48, 50 (Ky.
1966).
84 Campbell, supra note 19, at 780; see also Paula D. Osborn, Protective
Orders: The New Challenge, FOR THE DEFENSE, Mar. 1991, at 2, 4 ("Trade secret
status is generally reserved for information and documents specifically describing
the manufacturer's product development, manufacturing and testing procedures,
marketing and sales, and finances.").
85RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939). Section 757 was omitted from
the Restatement (Second) of Torts because the drafters felt that unfair competition
and trade practices regulation, and not tort law, more properly covered liability
from harm caused by unfair trade practices. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
introductory note to division 9 (1977).
86 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt b (1939). This comment suggests that
courts may consider the following six factors in determining whether the
information sought to be protected constitutes a trade secret: 1) the extent to which
those outside the business know the alleged trade secret; 2) the number and
positions of employees with knowledge of the trade secret; 3) the defendant's rules
and procedures designed to protect the secret; 4) the value of the trade secret to the
defendant or his competitors; 5) the effort and cost of developing the trade secret;
and 6) the ease or difficulty with which others could acquire or duplicate the trade
secret. See id.
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Even where the elements of a trade secret are satisfied, the court may
deny a manufacturer's request for a protective order. Courts have stated
that, for the purposes of Rule 26(c), the following are not permissible trade
secrets: information regarding the hazardous nature of the product and the
manufacturer's knowledge of the risks;87 information relating to other
accidents, complaints, and trial evidence;88 evidence of poor management
or business practices;8 9 matters affecting public health;9° and broad
allegations of embarrassment or the threat of injury to a corporation's
reputation.91
In cases where the manufacturer is unable to show that the information
qualifies as a trade secret, its next assertion is often that the challenged
documents are nonetheless entitled to protection because they are
confidential. 2 Confidential information has been defined as information
which, if disclosed, will cause a "clearly defined and very serious injury"
to the defendant's business. 93 The often cited federal standard for determin-
ing confidentiality of corporate documents is set out in Parsons v. General
Motors Corp.94 In Parsons, the manufacturer claimed that crash tests and
other information regarding the design and manufacture of the allegedly
defective vehicle had always been restricted, even within the corporation,
and were therefore entitled to protection.95 The court considered the
following factors: how many employees had knowledge of the information
or worked on a confidential project; how the defendant maintained the
secrecy of the information; how the defendant controlled or limited the
87 See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3d Cir. 1986); In
re Upjohn Co. Antibiotic Cleocin Prod. Liab. Litig., 81 F.R.D. 482, 483 (E.D.
Mich. 1979).
" See Smith v. BIC Corp., 869 F.2d 194,201 (3d Cir. 1989); Littlejohn v. BIC
Corp., 851 F.2d 673, 685 (3d Cir. 1988); see also Osborn, supra note 84, at 4.
9 See Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1074 (3d Cir. 1984); Joy
v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 894 (2d Cir. 1982); Garciav Peeples, 734 S.W.2d 343,348
(Tex. 1987); see also Osborn, supra note 84, at 4.
90 See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C., 710 F.2d 1165, 1180 (6th
Cir. 1983).
91 See Joy, 692 F.2d at 894; Cipollone, 785 F.2d at 1121.92 See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(c)(7).
3 United States v. International Bus. Mach. Corp., 67 F.R.D. 40,46 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); see also Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 428 F. Supp. 200,202-04 (S.D.N.Y.
1977).94 Parsons v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.R.D. 724 (N.D. Ga. 1980); see also
Campbell, supra note 19, at 781.
95 See Parsons, 85 F.R.D. at 725.
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reproduction and circulation of the information; the age of the information;
and whether any of the information was required by law to be reported to
the government.96 In denying the motion for a protective order, the Parsons
court emphasized the age factor, noting that the information sought to be
deemed confidential was ten years old. 7
Finally, where both trade secret and confidential information
arguments have failed, the manufacturer may argue that the information
should be entitled to protection to avoid "annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression, or undue burden or expense." 8 For this assertion to prevail, the
manufacturer must prove that the release of the discovered information
"would, by itself, have a direct impact on the company's financial
standing." 99 It has been recognized that this "category of protection
currently is ofvery little practical use except with regard to [a] narrow type
ofinformationwhich does not strictly compromise trade secret material."'' I
2. The "Good Cause" Balancing Test
It has often been said that, without more, pretrial discovery is not
entitled to judicial protection.10 This presumption of access to discovery
materials may be overcome by a showing of good cause under Rule
26(c).1' Through the use of umbrella protective orders, manufacturers
commonly attempt to shift the burden to the plaintiff to show why the
documents should not be protected. 3 A party seeking a protective order
cannot rely on conclusory statements but must show the specific harm that
will result from disclosure.' °4 The courts place a heavy burden of proof on
96 See id. at 726. Note that there is some overlap between Parson's "confidential
information" factors and the Restatement's "trade secret" factors. See supra note
86.
97 See Parsons, 85 F.R.D. at 726.
9 8 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c).
99 Osborn, supra note 84, at 5 (interpreting Smith v. BIC Corp., 869 F.2d 194,
201 (3d Cir. 1989), and Cippolone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 113 F.R.D. 86, 90
(D.N.J. 1986)). The defendant is also faced with the difficult task of differentiating
between the financial effect of publicity about the litigation in general and the
specific effects of any publicity about information revealed in discovery. See id.
100Id.
o ' See, e.g., Avirgan v. Hull, 118 F.R.D. 252 (D.D.C. 1987); Koster v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 93 F.R.D. 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
'02 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
'o
3 See infra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
"04 See Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1986); Reliance Ins.
Co. v. Barron's, 428 F. Supp. 200,204 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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the party seeking a protective order in order to effectuate the goal of
promoting discovery.'05 The movant must show not only that the informa-
tion is entitled to protection, but also that good cause exists for the entry of
the order.10 6
In one of the most influential decisions applying the good cause
requirement, In re "Agent Orange" Products Liability Litigation, 7 the
special master granted a petition by similar plaintiffs to unseal court
records.°8 The district court noted that if the movant for a protective order
fails to establish good cause, then the information is "available to the
public."'0 9 The court of appeals agreed, and held that "if good cause is not
shown, the discovery materials in question should not receive judicial
protection." 011 The court of appeals furthernotedthe Advisory Committee's
assertion that one of the reasons for Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(d)
is to provide access to "litigants similarly situated.""'
Because the good cause requirement is strictly construed, the movant
must make a particularized factual showing that it would suffer harm
should the court deny its motion for a protective order."2 The good cause
requirement demands that the movant show that it will suffer a specific,
serious injury if disclosure occurs."' The affidavit of an attorney, standing
alone, will rarely be sufficient to establish good cause." 4 Strict construction
of the good cause element is illustrated in Kamp Implement Co., Inc. v. J.
'os See Doherty, supra note 19, at 147.
1 It has been suggested that the defendant must show good cause before the
court may enter the order even where there is no opposition to the request, e.g., in
a case involving an agreed confidentiality order. See Richard A. Rosen,
Confidentiality Agreements Become Increasingly Elusive, NAT'L L.J., July 20,
1998, at B7.
117 In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 104 F.R.D. 559 (E.D.N.Y. 1985),
order aff'd, 821 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1987).
18 See id. at 564.
109 Id. at 567.
In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139, 145 (2d Cir. 1987).
'Id. at 146. Rule 5(d) provides, in part, that the court may order that certain
discovery documents "not be filed unless on order of the court or for use in the
proceeding." FED. R. CIV. P. 5(d). For a discussion arguing against the use of Rule
5(d) as a factor influencing protective order decisions, see Campbell, supra note
19, at 811-18.
"2 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
"I See Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 786 (3d Cir. 1994)
(quoting Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1071 (3d Cir. 1984)).
"
4 See Campbell, supra note 19, at 783.
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I Case Co.,1 5 where the trial court found that "[t]he protective order
proposed by [the] defendants... [was] not supported in its entirety by good
cause."116 The court instead entered an order which specifically permitted
the sharing of discovery materials with plaintiff's counsel in similar
cases. 17 The court stated:
Defendants maintain that they are not trying to keep information from
other litigants, but seek only to prevent confidential material from "freely
flowing" to third parties without any safeguards. While this position has
merit, the onus must be on the defendants to make a specific showing that
they will be harmed by a particular disclosure.Is
The burden of proving an assertion of privilege rests upon the party
asserting such claim. 119 Once the manufacturer has met its burden of
showing good cause for the issuance of a protective order, most courts
apply a balancing test, balancing the plaintiff s need for the information
sought against the injury to the defendant that will result if uncontrolled
disclosure is compelled.20 If the party seeking the protective order
successfully convinces the court that the harm that would result from
compelling disclosure is sufficient to warrant limiting the disclosure of the
discovered material, then the court may issue the order.' Many courts,
however, have limited the types of potential harm to the party seeking
protection that will be considered in this balancing. For example, damage
to a corporation's goodwill or reputation generally is not sufficient to
establish a need for protection." In addition, several courts have held that
the possibility that the plaintiffmay share the fruits of discovery with other
5 Kamp Implement Co. v. J. I. Case Co., 630 F. Supp. 218 (D. Mont. 1986).
1 6 Id. at 220.
17 See id. at 221; see also infra Part IV.
.
8 Kamp, 630 F. Supp. at 220.
119 See McFadden v. Norton Co., 118 F.R.D. 625, 627 (D. Neb. 1988).
120 See, e.g., Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 787 (3d Cir.
1994); see also Miller, supra note 8, at 433-34.
1 See Miller, supra note 8, at 432-33. The party seeking discovery can
show the information sought is relevant and necessary in order to avoid the
protective order after good cause has been shown by the party opposing discovery.
See id.
"See, e.g., Smithv. BIC Corp., 121 F.R.D. 235,242-43 (E.D. Pa. 1988), order
aff'd, 869 F.2d 194 (3d Cir. 1989). The court found this argument especially
unpersuasive in light of adverse publicity that had already occurred. See id. at 243.
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plaintiffs in related or unrelated cases does not constitute good cause for
the issuance of a protective order.'2 The idea is clear and simple:
[To force] each plaintiff in every similar action to run the same gauntlet
over and over again serves no useful purpose other than to create barriers
and discourage litigation against the defendants. Good cause as contem-
plated under Rule 26 was never intended to make other litigation more
difficult, costly and less efficient.124
C. "Umbrella" and "Agreed" Protective Orders
Rule 26(c) does not prescribe the precise scope of a protective order.
If a defendant in a products liability action has successfully met the
covered information and good cause elements, the court "may make any
order which justice requires."'' 2 Products liability cases typically involve
situations where the manufacturer possesses both confidential and non-
confidential documents that are responsive to a plaintiffs discovery
request, and even individual documents may contain both confidential and
non-confidential information.126 Manufacturers often argue that "[t]o sift
through all of the information and prepare a detailed explanation of the
confidential nature of each document the defendant seeks to protect would,
in such cases, require a vast work effort for many weeks."'27 These
defendants take the position that adherence to the requirements of Rule
26(c) would delay discovery, and so they seek the entry of blanket or
umbrella protective orders.12 1
" See, e.g., Patterson v. Ford Motor Co., 85 F.R.D. 152 (W.D. Tex. 1980); see
also infra Part IV.24 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 113 F.R.D. 86, 87 (D.N.J. 1986).
125 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). Of course, a protective order may cover only limited
specific and identified information. See, e.g., Pellegrino v. United States, No. 89-
CIV-8406, 1992 WL 84475, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.15, 1992) (regarding protective
order covering single, specified audiotape).
'16 See Campbell, supra note 19, at 785-86.
127 Id. at 786.
128 See In re Alexander Grant & Co. Litig., 820 F.2d 352, 356-57 (1 lth Cir.
1987); Tavoulareas v. Piro, 93 F.R.D. 24,29 (D.D.C. 1981); see also Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866 (E.D. Pa. 1981). The Zenith
court noted that careful scrutiny of every document in a complex case would make
the judge "a veritable hostage" consigned to "years of adjudication of the
confidentiality of individual documents." Id. at 878-79 n. 18. It is true that requiring
a defendant to meet the statutory requirements before a protective order is entered
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An umbrella protective order typically permits the manufacturer to
designate all documents producedduring discovery as confidential andthus
not subjectto dissemination by the plaintiff.12 9 These orders can effectively
be used to shift the defendant's burden of showing confidentiality to the
plaintiff to show that the information is not confidential.13 ° The plaintiff
who challenges the confidentiality of any documents covered by an
umbrella protective order is required to identify the specific documents that
do not qualify for protection.13 1 The manufacturer may use such an order
not in furtherance of Rule 1, but rather to subvert the goals of the discovery
process itself and shift the onus to the economically disadvantaged
plaintiff.132
In an effort to avoid meeting the strict requirements of Rule 26(c)(7),
manufacturers may wish to have the plaintiff enter an agreement whereby
all discovered documents are confidential and not subject to dissemination
or comparison with discovery received by other plaintiffs. One commenta-
tor has suggested that plaintiffs' reluctance to agree to umbrella protective
orders forced upon them by manufacturers "threatens to clog the courts
with costly and time-consuming discovery disputes.., and at the same
time impede settlement."133 However, this argument assumes a presumption
in favor of'protective orders. To the contrary, the rules clearly state that the
burden is on the proponent, ordinarily the manufacturer, to show that good
cause exists andthat the information is entitled to protection.134 The attempt
to shift that burden is especially troublesome to an already disadvantaged
plaintiff.35
may increase, at least initially, the burden on the courts. This assertion, however,
could be made with respect to virtually any rule.
129 See Doherty, supra note 19, at 149.
130 See id.
13 1 See Richard L. Marcus, Myth andReality in Protective Order Litigation, 69
CORNELL L. REv. 1, 18-20 (1983).132 See supra Part II.
133 Campbell, supra note 19, at 788 (arguing that a plaintiff's refusal to agree
to an umbrellaprotective order suggested by the defendant itself"might subvert the
underlying purpose of" Rule 1). It is also suggested that umbrella protective orders
"save the courts from becoming bogged down in the tedium of endless collateral
disputes over discovery, and enable the parties to proceed expeditiously with
preparation for trial." Id. at 787. The potential exists, of course, for the
manufacturer to use this same reasoning when suggesting that the plaintiff enter an
agreed protective order. In either case, the manufacturer receives the benefits, and
the plaintiff receives nothing. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
134 See supra Part III.B.
"' See infra notes 181-83 and accompanying text.
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Umbrella protective orders allow manufacturers to designate informa-
tion as confidential without showing good cause, leaving the burden and
expense of challenging the designation on the plaintiff. They are not
granted as a matter of right but rather are "typically permitted only in cases
of extremely complex litigation, and then with much hesitation."1 36
Umbrella protective orders allow a manufacturer to designate "all
discovery as protected, without any review or determination of 'good
cause' by the parties or court."'1 37 Accordingly, umbrella protective orders
are disfavored by most courts. 31 In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,139 the
manufacturer moved for an umbrella protective order prohibiting the
dissemination of both confidential and non-confidential material, asserting
that the order would facilitate discovery by streamlining litigation. 1 0 The
court, skeptical of the "wholesale designation of confidentiality by
defendants," denied the motion.141
Some umbrella protective orders permit the manufacturer to designate
as confidential any documents that they believe contain trade secrets or
other confidential commercial information, but not necessarily all
discovered documents. 42 As with any protective order, however, these
orders must be preceded by the manufacturer's showing of entitlement to
protection and good cause. These types of "protective orders are routinely
agreed to by the parties and approved by the courts in commercial
litigation, especiallyin cases between direct competitors."'4 3 In these cases,
the need to protect true trade secrets is most apparent. "'Good cause'
136 Andrew Corp. v. Rossi, 180 F.R.D. 338, 342 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (citing John
Does I-VI v. Yogi, 110 F.R.D. 629, 632 (D.D.C. 1986)) (emphasis added).
13 Bayer AG & Miles, Inc. v. Barr Lab., Inc., 162 F.R.D. 456,465 (S.D.N.Y.
1995).
138 See id.
139 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 113 F.R.D. 86 (D.N.J. 1986).
40 See id. at 93.
141 Id. at 93-94. It has also been noted that "the once-reflexive willingness of
judges to approve broadly framed protective orders has eroded. State and federal
judges nationwide are more skeptical of the appropriateness of such orders and will
often raise questions sua sponte about the scope or necessity." Rosen, supra note
106, atB7. The Cippollone court also rejected a public policy argument, noting that
Rule 26(c) does not authorize courts to make such policy decisions. The relevant
inquiry is into the harm the defendants would suffer without the order. See
Cippollone, 113 F.R.D. at 93-94.
142 See Gu6n6go, supra note 8, at 561-62 & n.18.
143 Bayer AG & Miles, Inc. v. Barr Lab., Inc., 162 F.R.D. 456,468 (S.D.N.Y.
1995).
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generally exists for issuance of a blanket protective order permitting
competitors to designate [as] 'confidential' certain commercial informa-
tion," although that presumption is not satisfied as easily in litigation
brought by an injured consumer.'"
IV. THE PLAINTIFF'S NEW TOOL: DISCOVERY SHARING
In a typical products liability action against a corporate manufacturer,
local attorneys in the jurisdiction where the case is filed are hired by the
manufacturer to work under the supervision of either a national or in-house
corporate counsel. 145 These local counsel benefit from being able to share
information among themselves and with the national counsel."4 Where
lawsuits involving the same allegedly defective product are pending in
multiple jurisdictions, the national counsel coordinates the management of
discovery and trial tactics.147 When a particular defense or strategy has been
successful, all local counsel can be advised of this defense by the national
counsel.'" Plaintiffs, who often suffer from a disparity in financial
resources, have a much greater need for such sharing of information.
Discovery sharing is useful whenever individual plaintiffs must litigate
against large, corporate defendants, as is often the case in products liability
actions.' 49 One court has noted that "[s]ome such plaintiffs may have
organized support, but many others may not."' 5 Either way, the court
stated that requiring each plaintiff to "go through a comparable, prolonged
and expensive discovery process would be inappropriate."' 5'
The term "information sharing" 152 generally refers to the sharing of
materials received from the defendant during discovery between counsel
144 Waelde v. Merck, Sharp & Dohme, 94 F.R.D. 27, 29 (E.D. Mich. 1981)
(emphasis added). Courts may be more willing to grant protective orders where a
competitor seeks the information because of the certainty that the information will
be obtained by the competitor and the obvious likelihood of competitive injury. See
id.
14 See HARE, JR. ET AL., FULL DISCLOSURE, supra note 7, at 163.
14 6 See id.
147 See id.
148 See id.
149 See Baker v. Liggett Group, Inc., 132 F.R.D. 123, 126 (D. Mass. 1990)
(discussing information sharing in tobacco litigation) (citing Cippollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 113 F.R.D. 86, 91 (D.N.L 1986)).
'
5O Id. at 126.
151 Id.
152 This is also commonly referred to as "discovery sharing."
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representing plaintiffs in similar cases against that same defendant.153
Information sharing mechanisms such as plaintiffs' information exchange
groups have received strong support from courts and commentators alike.154
In Ward v. Ford Motor Co.,' 55 the trial court overruled the magistrate's
order granting the manufacturer's motion for a restrictive protective
order.1 6 The plaintiff offered to agree to a protective order prohibiting
disclosure to the defendant's competitors and the public, but refused to
agree to nondisclosure to other similar plaintiffs. 57
The Ward court began by stating that "[t]he plaintiffs' attorneys'
discovery information exchange group reduces the effort and expense
inflicted on all parties, including Ford, by repetitive and unnecessary
discovery. In this era of ever expanding litigation expense, any means of
minimizing discovery costs improves the accessibility and economy of
justice."'5 8 The court next noted that where it is claimed that "a single
design defect is the cause of hundreds of injuries, then the evidentiary facts
to prove it must be identical, or nearly so, in all the cases. Each plaintiff
should not have to undertake to discovery [sic] anew the basic evidence
that other plaintiffs have uncovered."' 59 Requiring such repetitious
discovery "would be tantamount to holding that each litigant who wishes
to ride a taxi to court must undertake the expense of inventing the wheel.
153 See HARE, JR. ET AL., FULL DISCLOSURE, supra note 7, at 164-65.
"
5 4 See id. at 162. On the other hand, there are those who are skeptical of the
beliefs of this majority. Plaintiffs' information exchange groups have been deemed
"syndicates of contingency fee lawyers who have joined together to exchange
information." Campbell, supra note 19, at773. The defendant's national and local
counsel presumably would constitute a similar "syndicate" of billable hour
attorneys.
'" Ward v. Ford Motor Co., 93 F.R.D. 579 (D. Colo. 1982). Plaintiff's counsel
in that case, James L. Gilbert, has written extensively on the use and misuse of
protective orders. He is the co-author of many of the works cited herein, including
HARE, JR. ET AL., FULL DIsCLOsURE, supra note 7; Hare & Gilbert, Resisting
Confidentiality Orders, supra note 10; Francis H. Hare, Jr. et al., Confidentiality
Orders in Products Liability Cases, 13 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 597 (1989)
[hereinafter Hare, Jr. et al., Confidentiality Orders in Products Liability Cases]; and
Francis H. Hare, Jr. & James L. Gilbert, Discovery in Products Liability Cases: The
Plaintiff's Plea for Judicial Understanding, 12 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 413 (1989)
[hereinafter Hare, Jr. & Gilbert, Discovery in Products Liability Cases].
156 See Ward, 93 F.R.D. at 580.
157 See id.
158 Id.
159 Id.
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Efficient administration of justice requires that courts encourage, not
hamstring, information exchanges such as that here involved."' 6°
Sharing of discovery by plaintiffs has been strongly resisted by the
defense bar.'6' As one products liability defense attorney has noted,
"Unfortunately, courts generally view discovery sharing among plaintiffs
with similar cases as an efficient way to conduct litigation. 162 Discovery
sharing, especially in products liability cases, alleviates some of the
disparity in financial and legal resources between defendants and
plaintiffs. 63 In addition, it counters the longstanding and enviable position
of the manufacturer who possesses and controls most, if not all, of the
evidence needed by the plaintiff to prove her case. 164 As one court noted,
products liability actions "must rest basically on the records of the'
manufacturer and what information was known to him." 65 Despite the
continuing protestations of manufacturers, most courts and commentators
believe that discovery sharing is not only permissible but also appropriate
in keeping with the mandates of Rule 1.'1 The just, speedy, and inexpen-
sive determination of a particular case, as well as that of other similar cases
pending against a particular manufacturer, is enhanced where information
sharing is utilized. Manufacturers may attempt to use Rule 1 as the basis
for the entry of a protective order. In many cases, however, the application
of Rule 1, coupled with the plaintiff's legitimate need for information
sharing, counsels for denial of the order. Nonetheless, many commentators
still decry discovery sharing and put forth numerous arguments against its
use.
167
160 Id
161 See Gu6n6go, supra note 8, at 545.
'
62 Osbom, supra note 84, at 6 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
163 See HARE, JR. ET AL., FULL DISCLOSURE, supra note 7, at 164.
'4 See infra notes 195-98 and accompanying text
165 Hess v. Pittsburgh Steel Foundry & Mach. Co., 49 F.R.D. 271,273 (W.D.
Pa. 1970).
" See Gu~n6go, supra note 8, at 558 ("[D]iscovery sharing [is] over-
whelmingly deemed a valid Rule 1 interest"); see also Campbell, supra note 19,
at 784 ("Courts and commentators alike have generally tended to approve the
practice of information sharing, especially in products liability cases, as coming
within the aim of [Rule 1]."); Doherty, supra note 19, at 145 ("[Courts are]
increasingly unwilling to uphold broad protective orders forbidding discovery-
sharing among plaintiffs' attorneys in products liability cases."); Miller, supra note
8, at 497 ("It is difficult, and indeed unwise, to have an absolute prohibition on
discovery sharing.").
167 These arguments include that discovery sharing forces defendants into quick
settlements because of its injurious effect on other litigation against the defendant,
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It is argued that defendants "should not be forced to incur repeated
expense in responding to duplicitous discovery" where discovery sharing
is being used.161 This contention ignores the primary purpose of discovery
sharing. Discovery sharing is not concerned with the relationship between
the plaintiff and the defendant in a particular case. Rather, it focuses on the
relationship between similarly situated plaintiffs, with the defendant being
the only common thread between them.
Finally, opponents of discovery sharing assert that, even if it is not
specifically improper, it is somehow illicit. A recent New Mexico decision
is illustrative of most courts' treatment of this type of claim. In Krahling
v. Executive Life Insurance Co.,169 the trial court entered a blanket
protective order designating every document produced by the defendant in
discovery as confidential without requiring a showing of good cause for
such protection. 170 The defendant produced over 66,000 pages of docu-
ments, each of which was labeled confidential though no trade secret or
other privilege was asserted.17' After summary judgment was entered in
favor of the plaintiff, the plaintiff moved to lift the order of confidentiality
for the purpose of sharing the information with other plaintiffs. The
defendant contended that "sharing by the [plaintiff] with other [similar
plaintiffs] that are in litigation with [the defendant] around the country
would be a misuse of discovery for an 'illicit' purpose."'"
encourages frivolous litigation because of cheap and readily available discovery,
gives those plaintiffs who ride the coattails of false or deceptive claimants an unfair
advantage, and allows irrelevant information to impact on the defendant's rights
of privacy. See Gudn6go, supra note 8, at 545-46. Another commentator states that
plaintiffs may be initiating litigation "to find a wrong and report on it, and only
secondarily to obtain judicial relief." Campbell, supra note 19, at 826 (footnote
omitted).
These real or imagined injustices notwithstanding, no less an authority than
Professor Arthur Miller recognizes that there "'is no reason to erect gratuitous
roadblocks in the path of a litigant who finds a trail blazed by another."' Miller,
supra note 8, at 497 (quoting Wilk v. American Med. Ass'n, 635 F.2d 1295, 1301
(7th Cir. 1980); see also Thompson, supra note 16, at 495 (precluding plaintiffs
from information sharing "makes trial preparation more difficult and leads many
plaintiffs to either settle cheaply or proceed to trial with potentially inadequate
evidence").
'
68 Jarrow, supra note 19, at 323.
'
69Krahling v. Executive Life Ins. Co., 959 P.2d 562 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998).
170 See id. at 565.
171 See id.
'7 See id. at 564.
173 Id. at 568.
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Reversing the trial court's denial of the motion to lift the order, the
appellate court stated that "[t]he majority of courts that have considered
assertions of this nature authorize the practice of discovery sharing among
litigants," and that in the absence of"a bad faith purpose for the litigation
on the part of the discovering party, most courts agree that discovery
sharing serves Rule 1 interests and does not constitute good cause for entry
of a protective order." 74 The court went on to restate the often cited
presumption that
discovery should take place in public and that such presumption "should
operate with all the more force when litigants seek to use discovery in aid
of collateral litigation on similar issues, for in addition to the abstract
virtues of sunlight as a disinfectant, access in such cases materially eases
the tasks of courts and litigants and speeds up what may otherwise be a
lengthy process."175
Plaintiffs involved in complex product liability cases often form
litigation support groups to pool resources and to coordinate their case
preparation efforts.17 6 The principal objective of these groups is to provide
plaintiffs' counsel handling similar claims with the benefits of information
sharing.1" Plaintiffs routinely have access to all discovery materials in
products liability cases that are subject to class action or mass consolida-
tion procedures. 178 Local defense counsel in multi-jurisdictional products
litigation have access to sophistikated information-sharing mechanisms
implemented by their corporate client.179 Until recently, the individual
plaintiff was the only party to complex product liability litigation without
any means of information sharing. 80
'
74 Id. (citing Gu6n6go, supra note 8, at 548).
'sId. (quoting Wilk v. American Med. Ass'n, 635 F.2d 1295, 1299 (7th Cir.
1980)).
176 See HARE, JR. ET AL., FULL DISCLOSURE, supra note 7, at 164.
177 See id.
178 See id.
179 See id. A corporate defendant has vast resources, exclusive control of rele-
vant documents, and a system to coordinate legal and technical expertise. Their
local counsel benefit from mutual access to computerized indexing of relevant
documents and technical literature as well as summaries of expert opinions and
testimony. See Hendricks &Moch, supra note 6, at 424-25. The numerous benefits
to local defense counsel are discussed in detail in Hare, Jr. et al., Confidentiality
Orders in Products Liability Cases, supra note 155, at 597.
180 See HARE, JR. ET AL., FULL DISCLOSURE, supra note 7, at 164.
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Because products liability litigation is both technically and factually
complex, an information sharing mechanism is critical to an attorney's
ability to fairly and adequately prepare the client's case.'8' This problem is
most severe to solo practitioners and small firms, the largest portion of the
plaintiffs' bar. Information sharing "helps counterbalance the effect uneven
financial resources between parties might otherwise have on the discovery
process, thereby protecting economically modest plaintiffs faced with
financially well-off defendants and improving accessibility to justice."'8 2
Most importantly, information sharing closely corresponds with "the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."'8 3
The 1970 amendments to the Federal Rules authorizing the entry of
protective orders presented an opportunity for products liability defendants
to attempt to hinder or prevent information sharing by plaintiffs. Shortly
after the amendments took effect, manufacturers began testing their theory
that information sharing is improper, using protective orders as their means
of attack. An example is the 1973 case of Johnson Foils, Inc. v. Huyck
Corp.,184 where the manufacturer moved for an order preventing the
plaintifffrom using discovery material acquired from other similar cases.185
The plaintiff offered to agree to an order prohibiting disclosure of the
documents to the defendant's competitors and the public, but not other
similar plaintiffs, while the defendant proposed an order preventing any
and all disclosure. 86 The trial court, unmoved by the defendant's argu-
ments, entered an order permitting information sharing among litigants
with similar cases.187 In balancing the needs and interests of both parties,
the court stated that "[t]he fact that sensitive information is involved in
litigation gives a party neither an absolute nor automatic right to have the
discovery process hindered."'88
The court found that the manufacturer's proposed protective order
placed unacceptable limits on the use of the discovered information in
18 See Hare, Jr. & Gilbert, Discovery in Products Liability Cases, supra note
155, at 413.
182 Burlington City Bd. of Educ. v. United States Mineral Prod. Co., 115 F.R.D.
188, 190 (M.D.N.C. 1987).
183 FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
184 Johnson Foils, Inc. v. Huyck Corp., 61 F.R.D. 405 (N.D.N.Y. 1973).
185 See id. at 409.
186 See id. at 409-10.
'17 See id. at 410.
"' Id. at 409 (citing IntemationalNickel Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 15 F.R.D. 392,
394 (S.D.N.Y. 1954)).
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similar cases involving what were essentially the same litigants. 189 Perhaps
more importantly, the court noted that such an order "also unduly restricts
consultation by plaintiff of this case and others by providing for an overly
detailed and cumbersome protection procedure."'" These themes are
routinely restated by courts in denying inappropriate protective orders, but
their continued use and misuse show little sign of abating.1 91
To counteract the work load and work quality problems faced by a
single plaintiff's attorney fighting a defense team,1' 2 it is clear that the
cooperative efforts of a number of plaintiffs' attorneys in selecting,
analyzing, and summarizing the information revealed in discovery will
increase the quality of plaintiffs' counsels' work.93 When the results of
these combined efforts are shared by counsel representing plaintiffs with
similar cases, they serve to raise the case preparation status of any
individual plaintiff s attorney to the level ofthe leading practitioners in the
field.194 Counsel for the manufacturer will likely have access to an
enormous amount of shared information.195 Information sharing among
plaintiffs has become vital for their case preparation in order to adequately
deal with the manufacturer's wealth of resources. 96
The manufacturer has exclusive possession of most or all of the
documentation regarding their product and their knowledge of its relative
safety or danger.' 97 The manufacturer's internal documents, containing
critical evidence of many of the issues in dispute, are often "the single most
important source of information in a product liability case."'98 Plaintiff's
189See id. at410.
190 Id.
91It is probably impossible to know precisely how often confidentiality agree-
ments are entered in cases where the statutory elements have not been satisfied, but
the plaintiff has nevertheless agreed to the terms just to get the documents
produced. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
92 See Parnell, supra note 1; see also supra text accompanying note 1.
193 See HARE, JR. ET AL., FULL DISCLOSURE, supra note 7, at 165.
194 See id.
1s See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
196 See HARE, JR. Er AL., FULL DISCLOSURE, supra note 7, at 163.
197 See id. at 74-76.
'
98 Id. at 166. Internal documents may consist of the tests, studies, and other
corporate reports that are created in the normal course of the defendant's business
in designing, testing, manufacturing and distributing the allegedly defective
product. See id. at 74-75; see also Honda Motor Co. v. Salzman, 751 P.2d 489,493
(Alaska 1988) ("[W]ithout the design defect documents... [a plaintiff] cannot be
expected to prove either the existence of a defect or causation.").
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counsel must have full knowledge and understanding of these internal
documents to adequately prepare their case.
Information sharing among plaintiffs may be the only way to achieve
the full disclosure objective of the discovery rules.1'1 By comparing the
manufacturer's response to discovery in other similar cases, a plaintiff's
counsel can verify the consistency of the responses in their individual
case.2" Information sharing ensures "full and fair disclosure."'O
Manufacturers who are "subject to a number of suits concerning the same
subject matter are forced to be consistent in their responses by the
knowledge that their opponents can compare those responses." 202
The ability to exchange information with other lawyers who have
already undertaken a particular litigation matter narrows the scope of the
later discovery.0 3 Courts
have emphatically held that a protective order cannot be issued simply
because it may be detrimental to the movant in other lawsuits. Using fruits
of discovery from one lawsuit in another litigation, and even in collabora-
tion among various plaintiffs' attorneys, comes squarely within the
purposes of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2°4
It is never suggested that it is inappropriate for the manufacturer's
national and local counsel to share information, discovery responses, and
trial strategies in defending an allegedly defective product. It likewise must
not be considered suspect when two plaintiffs, who have been injured by
the same allegedly defective product, also share information. Sharing
199 See HARE, JR. ETAL., FULL DISCLOSURE, supra note 7, at 75. Discovery result-
ing from the cooperative efforts oftwo ormore attorneys handling similar cases is also
more likely to contain relevant information, and its relevance is more likely to be
recognized, than discovery receivedby a lawyerhandling asingle case. See id. at 166.200 See id.
201 Garcia v. Peeples, 734 S.W.2d 343, 347 (Tex. 1987).
2 2 d. (citations omitted).
203 See HARE, JR. ET AL., FULL DISCLOSURE, supra note 7, at 165. The cost re-
ducing effects on discovery resulting from information sharing among plaintiffs
may include: narrower discovery requests; pooling of common documents,
including deposition and trial transcripts, in a central depository; preparation of
model briefs addressing common legal issues; and preparation of summaries of key
internal documents. See Lawyers for Civil Justice Task Force, Court-Approved
Confidentiality Orders: Why They Are Needed, 57 DEF. COUN. J. 89, 89-94 (1990).204 Nestle Foods Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 129 F.R.D. 483, 486 (D.N.J.
1990) (citations omitted).
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reduces litigation expenses for the party most in need of a "just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination."205
V. CONCLUSION
It should be self-evident that "the spirit of the rules is violated when
advocates attempt to use discovery tools as tactical weapons rather than to
expose the facts and illuminate the issues by overuse of discovery or
unnecessary use of defensive weapons or evasive responses."20 6 The
unjustified use of Rule 26(c)(7) would constitute such a violation. Initially,
it may in some cases create an additional burden on already overburdened
court dockets to require a manufacturer to show that the documents sought
to be protected meet the requirements of Rule 26(c)(7). There can be little
doubt, at least as far as the manufacturer is concerned, that umbrella
protective orders can simplify their discovery obligations.
This approach, however, is inappropriately and fatally short-sighted.
Rule l's interest in a 'just" determination of every action dictates that
procedural ease on a court or a defendant must not be the dominant
concern.0 7 Rule l's requirement of a "speedy" determination directs that
all matters, especially those related to the often protracted stage of
discovery, must not be artificially slowed by unwarranted procedural
motions such as requests for protective orders where the elements of Rule
26(c)(7) cannot be met. Finally, the "inexpensive" mandate of Rule 1, so
critical to the individual plaintiff in an action against a corporate manufac-
turer, is effectively satisfied by such mechanisms as discovery sharing,
which help level the playing field. Manufacturers have, for some time and
on numerous grounds, objected to these mechanisms, and the courts
continue to reject overwhelmingly their claims.
A lawyer's ethical obligations demand that protective orders must not
be sought solely for the convenience of the manufacturer or its counsel.
Nor is it permissible to use protective order requests in order to frustrate
the plaintiff's attempts to obtain rightful redress. In addition, the attorney's
duty as an officer of the court demands that the long-range effects of any
protective order be given much consideration. Rather than focusing solely
on the particular burdens and benefits in a given case, the attorney must
accept the consequences of the order on parties to concurrent and
205 FED. R. CIV. P. 1; see Alan Lawrence, Comment, The Value of Copyright
Law as a Deterrent to Discovery Abuse, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 555 (1989).206 FED. K. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee's note.
207See supra note 33.
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subsequent litigation. Most importantly, the effect on the court system itself
must be factored into the decision on whether to proceed with any such
request.
It has now been over two decades since the Federal Rules were
amended to add the protections of Rule 26(c)(7), presumably as a "shield"
against improper discovery requests. The courts have repeatedly warned
that its provisions not be used as a "sword," as this would be in direct
contravention of Rule 1. The line of authorities is now long enough that a
manufacturer's plea that it "didn't know" must no longer be accepted. It is
imperative that individual plaintiffs and the courts demand adherence to
Rule 26(c)(7)'s terms, for neither the rule nor the law suggests that justice
is subservient to convenience.
